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The concept of “a language” (Einzelsprache, that is, one of many extant 
languages) and its opposition to “dialect” (considered as a “non-language,” and 
thus subjugable to an already recognized language merely as “its” dialect) is the way 
people tend to think about languages in the West today. It appears to be a value- 
-free, self-evident conception of the linguistic position. So much so that the concept 
of “language” was included neither in Immanuel Kant’s system of categories, nor 
in the authoritative Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch 
sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. This paper sketches the rise of the “dialect vs 
language” opposition in classical Greek, its transposition onto classical Latin, and 
its transfer, through medieval and renaissance Latin, to the early modern period. 
On the way, the Greek and Latin terms for “language” (and also for “dialect”) 
sometimes functioned as synonyms for peoples (that is, ethnic groups), which – 
importantly – contributed to the rise of the normative equation of language with 
1  I thank Michael O Gorman for his wise advice, ideas, useful references, and for help with 
polishing the prose of this article.
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nation in the early nineteenth century. It was the beginning of the ethnolinguistic 
kind of nationalism that prevails to this day in Central Europe.
Keywords: Language, dialect, a value-free, Immanuel Kant, classical Greek, 
classical Latin, renaissance Latin, ethnic group, Central Europe.
“When” is a language? Questioning naturalness
The concept of “a language,” in the sense of “one language among many” 
(Einzelsprache in German) as opposed to “language” in general, with no 
article preceding the word (or Sprache in German), is an artefact of culture, 
so much internalized by centuries of unreflective use that it appears to 
most of us to be “natural.” This perceived naturalness of the concept of a 
language is ingrained to such an extent that it (or its general counterpart of 
“language”) did not make an appearance among Immanuel Kant’s categories 
of the understanding (Kant, 1781) nor in the eight volumes of the famously 
authoritative reference Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon 
zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Brunner, Conze, & Koselleck, 
1972–1997).
But because language is the very medium of culture (as the primary 
basis for group formation and the maintenance of group cohesion) and 
of communicating ideas from person to person, there is a need to probe 
into the history of this concept and into the history of its social, intellectual 
and political functioning. With the dynamics of the term’s functioning 
explicitly uncovered (or “denaturalized”), it may become clear why people 
in the West, or intellectually influenced by it, tend to rationalize about 
languages in one way or another.
Prior to delving into the historical roots of the Western concepts of 
“language,” “a language” – and that of “dialect,” so inextricably connected 
to them – and into their coalescence as ideas and their subsequent uses, I 
believe it may be useful to scrutinize the Western practice of conceptualizing 
about the linguistic in terms of discrete and enumerable languages and 
dialects. In order to avoid tautology, alongside emotive and normative 
shades of meaning implicitly present when one speaks of dialects and 
languages, I propose to use the thus-far neutral term “lect” when speaking 
of any language variety.
The word “lect,” not (yet?) featuring in the popular Western discourse on 
the linguistic, allows for speaking dispassionately about language varieties: 
equally about those known as “languages,” and thus perceived positively as 
“true” and “legitimate,” and also about those pushed into the netherworld 
of often generalized contempt and neglect, branded as “dialects.” The 
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term “dialect” in popular speech carries negative connotations, while the 
concept of “a language” has positive connotations. No middle ground is 
conceded between them, and the two terms appear to function as a pair 
of binary oppositions. The rigidity of this normatively “negative–positive” 
dichotomy is underlain by the implicit normative principle that a dialect 
already “belonging to” a language cannot, or should not, become a language 
in its own right. Furthermore, this line of implicit thinking about the 
binary opposition appears to propose that in the modern (Westernized) 
world, there is room for languages only; hence, dialects must be slated for 
extinction.
The concept of “language” does a lot of insufficiently acknowledged 
spadework in Western thought. In general, it maps the linguistic in all its 
appearances. Foundationally, “language” (Sprache) denotes the biological 
capacity for oral communication through the production and reception 
of discrete, specific and repeatable articulated sounds that carry meaning; 
linguists term these “phonemes.” It appears that this capacity is truly 
present only in modern humans, though in the past it might have been 
shared with other hominoids. Elements of the capacity can be detected also 
in other species, but as far as we know, only humans have been capable of 
such widespread, intensive and continual employment of language so as 
to produce culture (cf. Lieberman, 1994, p. 126). In other words, culture 
is social reality (Searle, 1995), which has facilitated the broadening of the 
initial – quite limited – environmental niche of the Homo sapiens sapiens 
(vel modern humans) to almost the entire landmass of Earth, with the 
notable exception of the ice-bound Antarctic (cf. Bogucki, 1999, pp. 79– 
–126; Cavalli-Sforza & Cavalli-Sforza, 1995, pp. 188–202).
The capacity for language can be actualized and practiced only with other 
people, that is, in groups. (It appears that human groups as we know them can 
be formed and maintained exclusively thanks to language, which operates 
as “social glue” that keeps them together [Dunbar, 1993].) Therefore, its 
actualizations differ from group to group, giving rise to different language 
varieties, or lects. The totality of lects in time and space can be construed as 
“the linguistic.” (To a degree, the linguistic is identical with social reality, 
if the former term is employed also to denote the multifaceted uses of 
the linguistic that become and/or generate social reality.) The term “lect” 
emphasizes the discrete character of language varieties; “the linguistic” 
stresses their continuousness and togetherness. Lects rarely get separated 
from one another for good, being a function of relations of respective 
groups that spawned and use them mainly for creating and maintaining 
social cohesion, alongside in- and inter-group communication. Neither a 
man, nor a group, nor its lect is an island. And importantly, lects are not 
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entities in their own right, but depend entirely on the human groups that 
produce and utilize them – primarily for creating social cohesion, and also, 
though it is a secondary function, for communication.
The simultaneously discrete and continuous character of lects / the lin-
guistic can be likened to bodies of water in their natural state, which sprawl, 
intersect, overflow, are scarce at times, evaporate and are returned to earth 
from the sky as rain. Streams may serve as a metaphor for smaller lects 
(that is, spoken by fewer individuals, fewer groups). The bigger ones are 
rivers, while dynamically spreading languages of commerce may be seen 
as waterfalls and torrential downpours. Smaller linguae francae confined 
to well-defined areas appear to be rather like landlocked seas or motionless 
lakes. Interactions of human groups create linguistic deltas, oceans, straits 
and gulfs, sometimes calm, at other times rough, long-lasting and short- 
-lived, and in essence as unpredictable and contingent as decisions of the 
humans and groups that speak these very lects.
Somewhat separable lects emerge and persist for longer or shorter periods 
of time in larger or smaller spaces, but more often than not it is impossible 
to say when a single lect comes to an end and another commences. (That 
is why the number of human languages [Einzelsprachen] can never be 
exactly established, lects being only “semi-countable.”) In this respect, 
they exemplify the continuousness – some may say “nebulousness” or 
“cloudiness” – of the linguistic. There was no clear cut-off moment in time 
when Latin was replaced by French, Italian and other Romance languages. 
Likewise, on the spatial plane, it is hard to say where German stops and 
Dutch begins, or Ukrainian morphs into Russian.
Such changes are gradual, and become clear-cut only with the privilege 
of hindsight, when one has at one’s disposal a longue-durée-style picture 
of the change, and chooses to glide over the details that annoyingly blur 
the edges of the picture. The jealously guarded and hard to penetrate 
frontiers of the twentieth-century nation states in the Soviet bloc separated 
languages in an unprecedentedly sharp manner, leaving many with the 
false feeling that they are naturally separate entities. Until the enlargement 
of the Schengen Area in 2008, one needed just to step over the frontier 
line separating Slovakia from Poland to “tangibly” experience that Slovak 
stopped at this line and Polish immediately began across it.
On the other hand, intersections of clearly different and discrete lects 
result in pools of multilingualism or polyglossia. For instance, in the low-
lands around Preßburg (or today’s Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia), 
between the seventeenth and early-twentieth centuries, there were multi-
lingual villages, in which illiterate but multilingual peasants spoke to one 
another in Slavic (similar to present-day Croatian or Slovak), Hungarian 
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and German(ic) (Liszka, 1996). With time, distinctive lects may merge into 
brand-new syncretic lects, known as pidgins and creoles. They soften the 
sharp edges between distinctive lects, as the famous Mediterranean Lingua 
Franca did by creating a common space of communication among the 
speakers of Romance, Arabic, Turkic and Greek (Dakhlia, 2008).
The story of English itself is similar, the language being a Germanic- 
-Romance hybrid (creole), which emerged – beginning in the late eleventh 
century – in the wake of the intensive interaction between the Anglo- 
-Norman elite of Romance-speakers and the Germanic-speaking Anglo- 
-Saxon population subjugated by the former. Latin as the official language 
of the Western Christian world bound the two intermingling speech 
communities together even more. Hence, in written records, until the 
thirteenth–fourteenth centuries, it is often difficult to decide whether 
a sentence is written in (Medieval) Latin, (Norman) French or (Middle) 
English. All three lects cohabited closely then, to the point of being identical 
at times, before going their own separate ways later on (Catto, 2003, p. 36).
The complication of writing
Western-received knowledge includes treating writing as part and 
parcel of a language. Yet writing is a technology of graphic representation 
of language; it is neither language itself nor part of it. The relationship 
between writing and language is similar to that between a person and a 
photograph of himself. The photograph is not the person and does not 
constitute part of him. However, a link exists between the picture and the 
person. The photograph captures an image of the person which he wants 
to make known to others. Or it may be that he was caught unaware by 
a camera-wielding paparazzo, so that the image of the person is what he 
looks like in the eyes of other people. The link between the person and his 
image captured in the aforesaid picture may be of such social importance 
(cf. Edelman, 1979; Gaines, 1991) that the person concerned may try 
his best to remove it from public circulation with all the available force 
of the law. On the other hand, the photograph may become his badge 
of distinction, a logo, thanks to which he will become immediately 
recognizable to many.
Likewise, the link between writing and a lect is not a necessary one, as 
attested by the existence of more than 6,000 languages with no graphic 
representations of their own (“Ethnologue,” 2012; “Languages and Scripts,” 
2011). However, let us consider the popular topos of an undeciphered script 
or language. If we know which lect is represented by this undeciphered 
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script, it is possible to decipher it. And vice versa, if we understand a script 
in which an unknown lect is recorded, it is possible to reconstruct such 
a lect. But should it happen that we know nothing about the encountered 
script and about the language it represents, then we cannot decipher the 
texts.
Hence, just as light and its reflections visible to the human eye constitute 
the link between a person and her image captured on a photograph, the 
connection between a lect and its graphic representation (or writing) is not 
arbitrary. It appears that regularities governing the link were identified in a 
scholarly manner for the first time in 1901 (Baudouin de Courtenay, 1901; 
Ruszkiewicz, 1981, p. 21). The technology of writing reflects regularities 
present at different levels in the structure of language, but exclusively at 
the levels that are directly connected to the conveying of meaning (Rogers, 
2005, pp. 13–16).
In popular Western thinking, it is writing that makes lects into bone 
fide languages. This technology dams, orders, regularizes, channels and 
standardizes the aforementioned “sprawling and unrestrained natural 
water bodies” of the linguistic into consciously man-made “canals” and 
“pipes,” designed to serve specific needs and goals of human groups, in 
most cases construed as “states.” (Typically, these are large and intricately 
structured human groups that in numerical terms can be much bigger than 
groups with no knowledge of writing. This is because the technology of 
writing allows for regular and intensive non-face-to-face communication 
by detaching the message from the speaker and conveying it to listeners or 
readers who may never have a chance to meet the speaker in question, due to 
the sheer spatial and/or social distance separating them.) The end effects are 
languages, or lects shorn of their regional or social irregularities. These lects, 
in the process of becoming languages, are imposed or adopted as official 
languages. They become increasingly the sole channel of communication 
among a state’s inhabitants through the system of popular education, 
ubiquitous state administration, intrusive mass media and compulsory 
military conscription for all (or at least all males). This imposition takes 
place in areas belonging to a given state where lects are very different from 
the state / national language (and thus, construed as “foreign languages”), 
or quite similar ones (then dubbed “dialects”).
Such a regularized, standardized and normativized lect in the form of 
the sole national-cum-official language of a nation state can be likened to a 
straight pipe of wide diameter, or a broad-band optical fiber cable. A lect of 
this kind ensures communication that is instantaneous among all who speak 
and write it (and unhindered by differences present even in closely related 
lects). By the same token, these channels of communication also operate to 
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exclude outsiders by seeming to be opaque, difficult or impossible to enter. 
They appear to be like this to people who do not know the standard(ized) 
lect – or have just a nominal command of it. Such a nominal rather than a 
full command of the normatively “standard lect” is found where a speaker’s 
native lect has been subsumed as “just a dialect” of another lect that has 
been privileged by being declared the national language. The degree of such 
opaqueness, drawing a hard linguistic divide between “us” and “them,” 
is even higher in the case of ethnolinguistic nation-states, which require 
that their national languages be not shared by any other polities or nations. 
Opaqueness of this kind is a relatively low-tech cousin of China’s “Great 
Firewall” that filters “unwanted information” from the web, making only 
its ideologically sanitized version available to users in the country (cf. Gries 
& Rosen, 2010, p. 182).
This is not to say that unwritten lects are “natural” and regularized 
written ones – “artificial.” Both types are products of human groups, as in 
both cases it is human agency that arbitrarily ascribes certain meanings to 
certain sounds, and chooses to maintain this link as a prerequisite to effective 
in-group communication. From this vantage point, each lect is an artefact, 
similar for that matter to a teacup, a product of human effort and ingenuity. 
However, oral (unwritten) lects arise without the conscious intention of 
their speakers, being a function of the coalescence of a given group and its 
subsequent history. Its members speak to maintain the group’s cohesion 
and to communicate with one another. Most of them usually remain quite 
unaware that they speak something that can be rationalized as a lect, until 
the moment it is made into a visible thing with writing.
The conceptualization as a lect of the practice of speaking in a group is 
a recent phenomenon, most probably connected to the rise of writing. The 
scribe in the process of noting his and others’ words noticed that the same 
message could be expressed differently, and that preferring one word or 
phrase over others created texts conveying the same message, but different 
– sometimes starkly different – in form. Hence, not only did such (initially 
idiosyncratic and accidental) technological choices create written lects, but 
they also created the awareness that these choices could be controlled. This 
came with the realization that the resulting written lect may allow for a 
conscious reshaping of the actual practices of speaking in the original group 
of the lect’s native-speakers. This was usually in accordance with the wishes 
and needs of the group’s elite. Writing and the realization that lects can be 
shaped through writing became a source of power of the literati over the 
rest (cf. Biber, 2009; Goody & Watt, 1968; Kuckenburg, 2006, pp. 202–218). 
As a result, in highly literate societies writing shapes the linguistic as much 
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as, in reciprocation, the already “literatized”2 linguistic predetermines and 
limits writing in a given speech community (group). Perhaps this leads to a 
symbiosis between the written and the linguistic that may be described as a 
coevolution of lects and writing (cf. Coulmas, 2003, pp. 226–227).
To put it in different terms, the biological (or evolutionary) capacity 
in humans for walking does not in any necessary or direct manner have 
to lead to the rise of motorways. The most modest path would suffice, as 
suggested by the cases of other earthbound animals. Likewise, the biological 
(evolutionary) capacity for language in humans does not in any necessary 
or direct manner lead to the rise of the artefact of a written lect (or a 
language). An unwritten lect (or a dialect), so similar in this comparison to 
an accidental path, would suffice.
Unlike paths, motorways do not arise “by themselves.” They are a result 
of conscious, concentrated and multilevel human choices and decisions 
that may be available only to some groups, known as “states,” typically 
due to their huge demographic size and intricate organization. In this, 
motorways are similar to written and standardized lects, which people 
in the West see as “proper languages.” For such a language to arise, the 
users of its original spoken lect(s), residing in a specific place at a specific 
time, must conceptualize it as a language, endow this lect with a writing 
system, and decide on its acceptable and unacceptable uses and usages. 
This, coupled with certain technologies (writing, printing, popular literacy, 
mass media, nation state, or the internet) reinforces and reifies this freshly- 
-minted artefact of a language. Thus, it is partly detached from the human 
agency of the speech community, to allow for its improved control by the 
group’s elite. In turn, the elite deploys this standardized language – using 
all the aforementioned technological devices and channels – in order to 
intensify its use and circulation among the highly literate speakers. As a 
result, the homogenized and literatized lect appears to be an unambiguous 
“thing.” Before this development, one spoke to communicate; now one 
needs to speak a specific “thing” (lect), or artefact, shared and negotiated 
with the targeted interlocutor, before communication can even begin. The 
thus-created feedback makes this phenomenon gradually more evident and 
pronounced (Billig, 1995, pp. 29–30).
What is more, written lects are given a normative boost by the Western 
conceptualization of the linguistic in terms of the opposition between a 
language and dialect as the standard, normative way of thinking about lan- 
2 I allowed myself the freedom of coining the past-participle-style adjective “literatized,” from the 
term “literacy,” in order to denote the spread of increasingly universal knowledge of reading and 
writing in a group that makes the group’s own bubble of social reality (that is, its linguistic / lect) 
increasingly conjoined with and co-shaped by the ubiquitous practices of reading and writing.
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guage and its uses. This reinforces their perception as “proper languages,” 
further reifying their form, as intended by their shapers. Subsequently, 
increasingly official institutions, methods and devices emerge to flesh out 
and guard this normativity, such as language academies, authoritative 
dictionaries and grammars, state examinations, or parliamentary acts that 
introduce “language reforms,” ban “foreign languages” from public use, and 
elevate a privileged lect by declaring it to be an “official or national language.”
The “canals and piping” of the linguistic, regularized and standardized 
through writing and political decisions, become languages (Einzelsprachen). 
On the other hand, the sprawling and unkempt waters of language 
(Sprache), still remaining in the “state of nature,” and as such beyond 
the regularizing and normativizing reach of the technology of writing 
(or expelled outside its pale), become (or, more correctly, get labelled as) 
“dialects.” Dialects appear to be dialects in the West from the vantage of the 
users of writing with standardized languages at their disposal. Frequently, 
speakers are conditioned by formal education to see dialects as something 
“lower” or “worse” than languages. Hence, dialects are often made into 
“unter-languages,” “kitchen-languages,” “non-languages,” “patois” – slated 
for, first, anachronistic subsuming under the “umbrella of a language,” and 
finally for oblivion and eventual extinction.
As a word of caution, I hasten to add that talking of language as “natural 
and regularized bodies of water,” “pipes and optical fiber cables,” or as “paths 
and motorways” is speaking in metaphors. Hopefully, the images evoked 
to illustrate our argument are less teleological than August Schleicher’s 
biological metaphor (quite unreflectively borrowed from Charles Darwin’s 
theory of evolution) that proposes to see languages as “living organisms” 
that are born, grow, live, propagate, and then die. Endowing languages 
thus with agency makes them appear to be independent of humans and 
their groups. Metaphors are props to thinking, but not the actual subject 
of the analysis. Beware of, or at least be aware and be wary of, metaphors 
(cf. Mufwene, 2001, p. 145). They can be easily dragooned into the service 
of this or that ideology as has happened to Schleicher’s Stammbaum 
(“genealogical tree”) model of language diversification, which easily lent 
itself to discourses and political ends propagated by social Darwinists and 
ethnolinguistic nationalists (cf. Alter, 1999; Schleicher, 1869).From Ancient Greek to medieval and renaissance Latin
Below I attempt a brief – and thus, by necessity, simplified – overview 
of the history of the concept of a language. In the Western tradition, 
resoundingly imposed on the rest of the world during the age of high 
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imperialism and in the course of the Cold War that coincided with 
decolonization, lects are classified either as languages or as dialects. This 
quite confusing opposition of dialect versus a language (Einzelsprache) 
arose in Graeco-Roman antiquity.3 In Ancient Greek, the world glossa 
meant, first of all, the organ (muscle) of the “tongue.” This meaning is 
attested in Greek writings from the eighth century BCE. Three hundred 
years later, in the fifth century BCE, the word began to be employed for 
denoting “a language or dialect” (that is, a lect). In the third century BCE 
this new meaning was deployed for referring to peoples speaking different 
languages. Thus, the equivalence between the concepts “a people” and 
“a language” (that is, group and lect) made its first recorded appearance 
(Liddell & Scott, 1940, p. 353).
Later, but in parallel with the former term, the Greek word dialektos 
was coined. First, in the early fourth century BCE, it was intended to 
denote “discourse” or “conversation,” especially in the context of learned 
discussions conducted among philosophers and scholars (thence the 
philosophical term “dialectics,” of which Marxists tend to be fond). In the 
middle of this century, the term also began to stand for “speech,” “language,” 
and “common language.” In the second century BCE, dialektos came to 
mean “a language of a country,” thus becoming synonymous with glossa in 
this semantic field. And importantly for the rise of the current (Western) 
distinction between language and dialect, in the late first century BCE, 
dialektos was intended to denote “a spoken language,” as opposed to “a 
written language,” that is, glossa (Liddell & Scott, 1940, p. 401; Kamusella, 
2015, pp. 11–12).  
These semantic distinctions gradually brushed off onto the Latin lan-
guage of imperial Rome, due to the cultural symbiosis with the Greek lan-
guage and things Grecian that developed in the Roman Empire. The native 
Latin word lingua was attested, in the early second century BCE, to mean 
“the organ of tongue” and “the particular mode of speech in a given country 
or region” (Glare, 1982, pp. 1032–1033). These meanings corresponded 
closely to those of the Greek glossa, so with the rise of the intensifying Latin- 
-Greek bilingualism among Rome’s literati, in the late second century BCE, 
glossa was marginalized in Latin as a term for “a collection of unfamiliar 
words” (that is, a “glossary”). And the neologism glossema was coined for 
“an unusual word requiring explanation” (Glare, 1982, p. 767).
In the 30s of the first century BCE, the Greek loanword dialectos was 
attested in Latin for “a dialect, a form of speech [hence, unwritten]” (Glare, 
3 It would be interesting to investigate how people and scholars classified lects outside the confi-
nes of the Graeco-Roman world and the West. That task, however, falls outside this article’s scope.
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1982, p. 536). Thus, almost immediately, the Greek distinction of the late 
first century BCE, between “spoken language” (dialektos) and “written 
language” (glossa) was adopted by Latin writers, and duly reflected in the 
opposition between dialectos and lingua. The distinction was consolidated 
in the Greek texts of the first and second centuries CE that frequently were 
translated into Latin. The prime example of this Graeco-Latin bilingualism 
was the New Testament, composed in Greek during the first century CE 
and translated into Latin in the late second century CE, before the canonical 
Latin translation of the entire Bible (the Vulgate) was completed at the turn 
of the fifth century CE (Kamusella, 2015, p. 12). 
In this way, in the world of Western Christianity (where Latin domi- 
nated for written purposes throughout the Middle Ages until the 
Reformation), the terminological distinction between those lects endowed 
with a written form and those without one became integral to the Western 
intellectual tradition. In addition, it was accompanied by the emergence of 
the equation of a lect with a people. A lingua (“language”) was associated 
with a natio (“people,” “race,”4 “set of people,” “the people of a country, or 
state”) (Du Cange, 1885, p. 116; Glare, 1982, p. 1158), and at times with 
a gens. This last term (gens), in addition to the aforementioned meanings 
shared with natio, came to be used for referring to “a region of a country, 
occupied by a people.” In medieval Latin, it was also used (alongside natio) 
to denote such a distinctive people, living in a polity’s region, and differing 
from the rest of the country’s inhabitants in language, customs, religion, 
or, as we would say today, in ethnicity (Glare, 1982, p. 759). The most 
visible formalized use of this meaning was employed at universities, where 
students were subsumed under the rubric of this or that natio on the basis 
of language and territorial origin (cf. Kibre, 1948). 
Interestingly, medieval authors writing in Latin shunned the word 
dialectos and in its stead, at the turn of the thirteenth century, developed 
the neologism linguagium for a regional lect or a lect with no written form5 
(Du Cange, 1885, p. 117). The word “dialect” re-entered Western discourse 
in the Renaissance, though authors disagree as to whether this was by 
way of the renewed study of Ancient Greek or that of Latin mediated (or 
4 “Race” in this sense is an obsolete world in English, today usually replaced by the term “ethnic 
group.”
5 Perhaps this term was an inspiration for Greek Catholics (Uniates) conversant with Latin, who 
coined the derogative term iazychie (roughly “quasi-language,” or “corrupted language”), from 
the Slavic word iazyk (“language” and “tongue” as an organ), for referring to the written language 
of eastern Galicia, a language based on the regional Slavic lect and on Church Slavonic, with an 
admixture of Russian and Polish words. This language was employed in writing in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, and was reviled at that time as much as was Yiddish, known deroga-
tively as “jargon” (cf. Rusinko, 2003, p. 234; Weinreich, 2008, p. A309). 
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not?) by French (cf. Ciorănescu, 2005, p. 291; Dizzionario, 2004, p. 152). 
For instance, in the 1570s, in the case of English, “dialect” was deployed to 
mean “a subordinate form of a language, a manner of speech peculiar to a 
group of people” (“Dialect,” 2012, p. 2; Murray, 1893, pp. 307–308). The 
word “subordinate” clearly indicates here a normativity built into the novel 
term “dialect,” necessarily requiring an “umbrella” of a respected language 
(an official written lect of a state and/or of the state’s elite) for the unwritten 
lect (“dialect”) of a region, of the peasantry or of a non-dominant ethnic 
group in a polity (Kamusella, 2015, p. 16). Nationalism and the concept of a language: The beginnings
With this development, the present-day Western understanding of a 
dialect appeared: a lect not endowed with a written form, spoken in a region 
of a polity, by the region’s inhabitants, or by an ethnic (ethnolinguistic) 
group living in the region. Interestingly, this lect defined as “a dialect” 
must be subjected to, or subsumed into, the official written lect (language) 
of the polity as the language’s “subordinate form.” On the one hand, this 
relationship is a reflection of the antique and medieval tradition of equating 
peoples (ethnic groups) with their lects (languages), and quite often, with 
specific regions, too. On the other hand, it is a reflection of the modern 
concept of exclusive (absolute) sovereignty that became one of the basic 
principles of modern statehood, originating with the rise of the territorial 
state (the direct precursor of today’s nation state) after the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648) (Klueting & Schmale, 2004; Krasner, 1999, p. 11).
In this line of thinking, only one monarch, or one government, has the 
exclusive right of ruling the subjects living on the territory of a given polity, 
unfettered by any legitimate interference from any external authority. And 
in the case of making the decision that only one language could be official 
for the polity (as came to be prevalent among the Protestant states following 
the Reformation and became the norm during the Age of Nationalism that 
was ushered in in Europe by the French Revolution), other lects spoken 
and written on the territory of a polity had to be either suppressed or at 
best redefined and demoted to being “just dialects” of the polity’s official or 
national language.
The French onslaught that destroyed the Holy Roman Empire in 
1806 brought out an anti-French reaction in the polity’s predominantly 
Germanicphone population, though it was couched in the political vocab-
ulary of the French Revolution. A novel German nation was proposed, to be 
set against the revolutionary French nation. The problem was how to define 
this German nation. There was no German state that could transform its 
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population into such a nation, as had happened in the case of revolutionary 
France, which had called the French nation into existence. In the absence of 
a state which could be credibly dubbed “Germany,” the German(ic)phone 
elites settled on the German language as the foundational basis of the 
nation and its yet-to-be-created nation state (Greenfeld, 1992, pp. 89–188, 
275–396; Schulze, 1991, pp. 48–55).
Intellectually, the development drew on the German language as the 
written language of the Holy Roman Empire. Between 1521 and 1534, Martin 
Luther translated the Vulgate (or the canonic Latin translation of the Bible) 
into the Germanic lect of Meißen (in Lusatia, Saxony). This city was then 
conveniently located in the very center of the German(ic)-speaking world 
that embraced most of the empire, alongside Prussia across the empire’s 
eastern frontier, and the Baltic littoral, which was historically associated 
with the Hanseatic League. In today’s geography, the empire and its 
Prusso-Baltic fringe were composed of a variety of (frequently multilingual 
and multiethnic) territories, extending from Estonia to Trieste and from 
Switzerland to Denmark. Despite the Catholic–Protestant rift splitting 
the empire and its territories, Luther’s translation of the Bible established 
definitively what the German language should be. This Luther-inspired 
German was gradually accepted by both Catholics and Protestants, to the 
detriment of the standing of the Catholic “Common German,” which had 
its dialectal basis in imperial Vienna. Luther himself and then subsequently 
publishers of the numerous editions of the “German Bible” selected words 
that were most intelligible to all the speakers of the variegated Germanic 
lects throughout this vast area. Moreover, they provided glossaries 
explaining less intelligible terms and expressions in words taken from the 
regional lects of targeted readerships (Bach, 1966, pp. 199–201, 209–210, 
216–217, 278–281; Szulc, 1999, pp. 63–74, 81–84, 89, 94–95).
In the eighteenth century, the reaffirmation of German as a language 
in its own right which should be equal to Latin and French led to the 
rise of an intellectual opposition to the French language as such and to 
French linguistic loans in German. This prepared the ground for making 
this language into the main anti-French ideological platform of German 
nationalism during the Napoleonic Wars (Bach, 1966, pp. 272–274). The 
ideas were espoused by many of the 300,000 to half a million members 
of the Bildungsbürgertum (or the educated – that is, literate – nobles 
and burghers, together with their families). Out of the German language 
and literature these people fashioned their own niche of social reality in 
state offices, schools, law courts and merchant companies in the plethora 
of polities within the Holy Roman Empire, and in their successor states 
(Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 61). The literati adopted the increasingly normative 
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equation of a language with a people, and then with a nation, especially 
under the staggeringly powerful influence of Johann Gottfried Herder’s 
bestseller Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Outlines 
of a Philosophy of the History of Man). The philosopher-cum-early- 
-anthropologist saw lects as constitutive and, in turn, a faithful reflection of 
the culture(s) of human groups speaking them (Herder, 1784–1792).
It was this ready-made intellectual kit that leaders of the early German 
national movement seized on at the turn of the nineteenth century as 
the instrument for defining the German nation and its intended nation- 
-state. Most members of the Bildungsbürgertum concurred and in this 
way the ethnolinguistic model of nationalism emerged (cf Ergang, 1931; 
Jolles, 1936; Kedourie, 1993, pp. 53–54, 57). The suppression of German 
nationalism after the Congress of Vienna (1815) was in the interest of the 
reassertion of the monarchical principle of divinely legitimated power. At 
that moment, with Napoleonic France finally defeated, it was not necessary 
to invoke the novel creed of nationalism for mobilizing the masses. Indeed, 
it was actually perceived to be harmful to the dynastic interests of the 
monarchs ruling in Central and Eastern Europe. The masses were to be 
quiescent and it was this enforced quiescence that permitted the reversion 
to monarchical rule, substantially as it had been under the various anciens 
régimes of Europe. 
However, the suppression of nationalists from above did not prevent 
the idea of ethnolinguistic nationalism from spreading in the German 
Confederation (or today’s Germany, western Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Austria and Slovenia), and the Habsburg and Prussian lands outside it (that 
is, in present-day terms, Russia’s enclave of Kaliningrad, northern Poland, 
Slovakia, southwestern Ukraine, Hungary, north-western Romania and 
Croatia). This thinking also reached the Baltic provinces of Russia, where 
a German(ic)-speaking nobility was dominant (in today’s Estonia, Finland 
and Latvia). Carried by Polish- and German-language publications, it 
seeped into western Russia (or today’s Belarus, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Ukraine). In books in German and in Scandinavian Germanic 
languages, it extended its influence northward to Scandinavia. The long- 
-lasting dynastical, cultural and economic links between the erstwhile Holy 
Roman Empire (in 1804, partly replaced in this role by the Austrian Empire) 
and polities in the Apennine Peninsula contributed to the rise of Italian 
ethnolinguistic nationalism. In like manner, the political and intellectual 
retinues of German-speaking princes from the German Confederation 
who became monarchs of many freshly independent Balkan nation-states, 
from Romania to Greece, spread the ideas of ethnolinguistic nationalism 
southward, to the Balkans and Anatolia. As a result, aspiring leaders of 
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non-German-speaking peoples from Scandinavia to Sicily and Crete, and 
from the Netherlands and Denmark to the Black Sea littoral adopted this 
ideology (cf. Bittner, 1929; Mackridge, 2009, p. 222; Mauro, 1991, pp. 278– 
–279; Sommer, 2009, pp. 168, 245; Sundhaußen, 1973). 
But for the time being, it was a minority pursuit. The turning point 
came in the revolutionary year of 1848, which established ethnolinguistic 
nationalism as one of the accepted novel (modern) ideologies of statehood 
and of “peoplehood” organization and legitimization, alongside the 
equally novel socialism and democracy. The admonishment by Bernard 
Bolzano, the world-famous logician from the University of Prague, 
delivered poignantly in 1848, the year of his death, went unheeded. He 
believed it was not necessary to divide Bohemia between Czechs and 
Germans on an ethnolinguistic basis when a bilingual Bohemian nation 
could be proclaimed instead (Bolzano, 1849). Likewise, the leaders of the 
1848–49 Hungarian uprising against the Habsburgs chose ethnolinguistic 
Hungarian (Magyar) nationalism rather than the territorial concept of a 
Hungarian nation speaking many Hungarian languages, of which Magyar 
would be just one, brushing shoulders with Croatian, Romanian, Slovak 
or Rusyn. There was no desire left for this centuries-old non-linguistically- 
-based Hungarus-Patriotismus, steeped in the non-ethnically specific 
official language of Latin as its “social glue” (Maxwell, 2009, pp. 34–55).
Burgeoning ethnolinguistic national movements seized the political 
momentum in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Kingdom 
of Italy and the German Empire were founded as ethnolinguistic nation 
states, in 1861 and 1871, respectively (Bach, 1966, p. 325; Mauro, 1991, 
pp. 1–9). Vienna, defeated by Prussia in 1866, conceded to the dissolution 
of the essentially multiethnic and multilingual German Confederation, and 
agreed to the transformation of the Austrian Empire into a Dual Monarchy 
of Austria-Hungary. The empire’s multiethnic character was preserved in 
the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, though cultural-cum-political 
autonomies couched in ethnolinguistic terms had to be introduced in some 
of its crownlands (regions), for instance, for the Poles of Galicia and for 
the Czechs of Bohemia. On the other hand, much to the chagrin of non- 
-Magyars, the Dual Monarchy’s Kingdom of Hungary was shaped into a 
de facto Magyar ethnolinguistic nation-state (nemzetállam in Hungarian) 
(Kann, 1977, pp. 521–560).
These changes eventually brushed off on the Russian Empire, where, 
beginning in the 1880s in its European section, Russian gradually replaced 
other languages in administration and education, making the imperial idea 
closely related to linguistic (if not ethnolinguistic) Russianism (if not Russian 
nationalism per se) (Miller, 2008; Staliūnas, 2007; Thaden, 1981; Weeks, 
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1996). In the wake of World War I, which wiped away the ideologically non-
national empires of Austria-Hungary, the Ottomans and Russia, broadly 
construed Central Europe was divided among ethnolinguistically defined 
nation states, for which various national movements had agitated since the 
mid-nineteenth century (cf. Hroch, 1985). Likewise, Balkan nation states, 
which earlier had predominantly employed religion and ecclesiastical 
boundaries for nationhood and statehood building and legitimation, 
settled for language as the foundation of their nationalisms (cf. Kamusella, 
2008, pp. 201–288; Mackridge, 2009, p. 283; Nikolova, 2006).
It is interesting to observe that in the 1830s and 1840s, Slavophone 
scholars from the Austrian Empire, under the influence of German 
ethnolinguistic nationalism, proposed the concept of a Slavic nation and its 
Slavic language. This closely followed the model of the German language, 
as consisting of standard German based on the language of Luther’s Bible, 
within which other Germanic lects (construed as dialects) were contained, 
but not employed in writing. The problem was that due to the absence 
of a state that would contain most or at least a plurality of the Slavic- 
-speakers (as in the case of the Holy Roman Empire vis-à-vis Germanic- 
-speakers), several written standard Slavic lects had developed with their 
own translations of the Bible, namely, Czech(oslav), Illyrian (Croatian 
and Serbian), Polish and Russian (Kamusella, 2008, pp. 224–229, 538–241; 
Maxwell, 2009, pp. 79–100).
The aforementioned nineteenth-century scholars saw these lects as equal 
“written dialects” of a single Slavic language, to be mastered in writing by 
all educated Slavs. In turn, the written dialects were seen to be composed 
of subdialects. But the lack of a common Slavic statehood or a historical 
tradition of such a statehood militated against the coalescence of an All- 
-Slavic language. Furthermore, the religious differences symbolized and 
emphasized by the use of the Cyrillic alphabet by Orthodox Slavs, of the 
Latin alphabet by Catholic and Protestant Slavs, and of the Arabic script 
by Muslim Slavs made a merger of the different Slavic literary traditions 
next to impossible. The creation of bi-scriptural Serbo-Croatian/Croato- 
-Serbian as the language of Yugoslavia did not survive the breakup of that 
polity. It may be that if more than one script is used for writing a lect, 
it faces the very strong possibility of splintering into as many separate 
languages as there are scripts. On the other hand, it is possible for lects that 
differ from each other as much as German and French do to be fashioned 
into dialects of a single language when such a normative unity is enforced 
through a single script and long-lasting common statehood, as in the 
case of the frequently mutually incomprehensible dialects of the Chinese 
language (cf. Künstler, 2000; Maxwell, 2003).
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Conclusion, or fast forward to the present day
In the 1920s, linguists – building on the politically and emotionally 
charged two-tier classification of lects (entailing that the lect construed as the 
nation-state’s “national language” should contain other lects spoken on the 
polity’s territory as “dialects”) – proposed that languages (Einzelsprachen) 
are mutually incomprehensible lects, whereas dialects are mutually 
comprehensible (Bloomfield, 1926, p. 162). However, this approach raised 
many difficult, even paradoxical, questions. It could not explain why 
mutually incomprehensible Arabic lects should be dialects of standard 
Arabic (cf. Ferguson, 1959), nor suggest what to do about differing degrees 
of and asymmetric (in)comprehensibility among Scandinavia’s Germanic 
lects (Haugen, 1966). It could not decide if Romanian and Moldovan (being 
identical) are one language or two, nor explain why Low German, which 
is incomprehensible to speakers of standard German, should be a dialect 
of this language rather than of Dutch, with which it is largely mutually 
comprehensible.
Soviet scholars did not participate in these Western theoretical 
discussions on the definition of “a language” (Einzelsprache) and its 
relation to “dialect.” However, taking their cue from Joseph Stalin’s famous 
1913 essay (Stalin, 1942) and following his orders in his capacity as the 
Soviet Commissar of Nationalities (Blank, 1994), they, together with Soviet 
politicians and doctrinaires, set out on an unprecedented campaign of 
language-building (iazykovoe stroitel’stvo, as the official Soviet Russian term 
had it [cf. Grande, 1939; Potseluevskiĭ, 1935]). (They knew that creating 
languages was possible, as they were human artefacts [Peterson, 1927], 
from the influential and convincing example of the constructed language 
of Esperanto that was very successful with users [cf. Dr Ėsperanto, 1887; 
Żelazny, 2012]. Western scholarship began to address and analyse this issue 
only quite belatedly during the 1970s [cf. Rubin & Jernudd, 1971].)
Through writing, impositions from above, grammars, dictionaries, 
(compulsory) popular elementary education and state offices, the Soviet 
apparatus constructed from scratch such languages as Azeri, Karelian, 
Turkmen and Uzbek, and destroyed those not fitting the Kremlin’s 
ideological purposes, for instance, Chagatai, Hebrew and Persian in the 
Arabic script (insofar as the latter two existed on Soviet territory) (Edgar, 
2004, p. 131; Hirsch, 2005; Smith, 1998, pp. 4, 157). Soviet language-builders 
often did not know or understand the exact linguistic mechanisms and 
processes that they were tweaking, even as they successfully implemented 
their decisions by mobilizing the full force of Soviet power. With their 
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feats of sociolinguistic engineering, or even derring-do, they proved that 
lects, especially those written and standardized into languages, are indeed 
artefacts, clearly being products of human will and inventiveness.
Kemalist Turkey followed a similar course by destroying the Arabic- 
-script-based Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish), and replacing it with a 
radically different Turkish in Latin letters, fashioned on the spur of the 
moment at the founding of a Turkish nation state and in its immediate 
wake (Lewis, 2002).
After World War II, the coalescing field of sociolinguistics (stemming 
from “language planning,” as pursued in many postcolonial nation-states 
[cf. Fishman, 1974; Jacob, 1946, pp. 21–24, 76]) proposed in the West that 
extralinguistic factors (usually political decisions) are involved in deciding 
which lect is a dialect and which a language (Weinreich, 1945). Thus, 
mutually comprehensible dialects may be made into separate languages (so- 
-called “Ausbau languages” or “languages by extension”) through planned 
dissimilation or administrative fiat. On the other hand, absolute or relative 
incomprehensibility between lects may be reconfirmed by recognizing them 
as separate languages in their own right (so-called “Abstand languages” or 
“languages by distance”) (Kloss, 1967). In the latter case, however, mu-
tually incomprehensible (Abstand) lects may also be made into dialects of a 
single language with the help of widespread diglossia buttressed by unitary 
statehood in the religious-cum-cultural tradition, as in the case of Chinese 
or Arabic (cf. Ferguson, 1959).
This clearly political – or more exactly, ideological – concept of “a 
language” (Einzelsprache) (as developed in the West), well understood 
by sociolinguists, has not yet percolated from the scholarly domain to the 
general public. As a result, ethnolinguistic nationalism, perceived to be 
“normal,” remains, thus far, the sole ideology of statehood and nationhood 
legitimation in Central Europe. This view hinges on the seemingly 
“natural” belief that in order to be nations in the fullest sense, human 
groups must enjoy their own specific languages. The other component of 
this view is that there cannot exist “true” languages that are not spoken 
and “possessed” each by one nation only. Should such lects crop up, they 
must be redefined as dialects of extant national languages, or – which is an 
option that is generally resisted by existing recognized nations – the lects’ 
speakers should be fashioned (or ought to fashion themselves) into nations 
of their own. This logic leads to the observed reluctance, on the part of the 
state, to recognize Kashubian and Silesian as languages in their own right in 
Poland, or Moravian and Silesian in the Czech Republic. And by the same 
token, languages other than French, though indigenous to the territory of 
France, cannot be ethnic or minority languages; they may be only “regional 
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languages,” if the traditional, though now pejoratively perceived, term 
patois cannot be applied to them any longer (Żelazny, 2000, pp. 302–313).
Talking of languages, as is done using the concepts that at present we 
have at our disposal in the Western intellectual tool box, is not a neutral 
discussion, let alone idle talk. Depending on which turn the discussion 
takes, it may mean: the unmaking of a language or the creation of a new one 
from a dialect; the demotion of a language to the rank of a dialect; or the 
subsuming of a “free flowing,” “unmoored” dialect under the “umbrella” of 
an expanding national or state language, thus entailing the disappearance 
of the former. This is nothing new: lects did emerge and disappear before 
the rise of writing, modernization and nation states, as they undoubtedly 
will in the future. But before writing, the processes unfolded on the small 
scale of face-to-face human groups, perhaps without much awareness on 
the part of humans themselves, unless their own group happened to be 
wiped out and the lone survivor had to find refuge with groups speaking 
radically different lects. And this meant the end of the lect associated with 
her original group.
In the modern world, with the employment of the aforementioned 
unprecedented technologies and techniques, lects can be created, destroyed, 
spread or contained much more quickly and on a massive scale, across 
entire societies, states, and continents. This can require even tens of millions 
of people to alter their linguistic habits virtually overnight, as was the 
case with the introduction of Indonesian (Malay) in the overwhelmingly 
non-Indonesian-speaking Indonesia, or of Urdu in similarly non-Urdu- 
-speaking Pakistan (“Population,” 2012; Swaan, 2001, pp. 85–86). In Europe, 
the intergenerational transmission of German was extinguished among 
communist Poland’s German minority of about one million in the span of 
a couple of years after World War II. As a result, the vast majority of the 
quarter of a million Polish Germans do not know the language (Kamusella, 
2012a).
At present, the world’s entire landmass (apart from the uninhabited 
Antarctic) has been strictly divided among nation-states in the wake of the 
decolonization in the second half of the twentieth century. The worldwide 
spread of the nation-state as the sole legitimate model of statehood and 
peoplehood also functions as the conveyor belt par excellence of Western- 
-style modernity to each nook of the world (cf. Kohn, 1962). Integral to this 
is the concept of a language (Einzelsprache) in its dichotomous relation with 
that of a dialect. The contemporary world is characterized by instantaneous 
and increasingly borderless communication and by the continuous transfer 
of previously unimaginable amounts of information. In this new world, the 
concepts of a language (Einzelsprache) and dialect are rapidly normativized 
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and normalized. In turn, they are built into the very intellectual-cum- 
-technological paradigm and infrastructure that underlie the software and 
the hardware of IT industry and of the internet. On the one hand, these 
concepts have become so much internalized as to appear invisible in their 
perceived “normality,” while on the other, they de facto banish and make 
illegitimate all alternative ways of thinking and conceptualizing on the 
linguistic (cf. Kamusella, 2012b).
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Dzieje normatywnej dychotomii języka i dialektu:  
Od greko-łacińskich źródeł po państwa etnicznojęzykowe 
Europy Środkowej
Pojęcie języka jako jednego z wielu (Einzelsprache) stawiane w diame-
tralnej opozycji do „dialektu” (czyli „nie-języka”, który normatywnie musi 
zostać przyporządkowany jakiemuś już wcześniej uznanemu językowi jako 
jeden z jego dialektów) stanowi formę pojęciową, poprzez pryzmat której 
postrzega się języki i dyskutuje o nich we współczesnym świecie Zacho-
du. Z powodu powszechnego uznania owa forma pojęciowa wydaje się tak 
oczywista i wolna od nacechowania ideologicznego, że Immanuel Kant 
nie uwzględnił języka w zaproponowanym przez siebie systemie katego-
rii filozoficznych, podobnie jak i autorzy niezmiernie wpływowego dzieła 
z zakresu historiografii i socjologii politycznej o znamiennym tytule Ge-
schichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch sozialen Spra-
che in Deutschland. 
W niniejszym artykule przedstawiam wyłonienie się opozycji języka wo-
bec dialektu w starożytnej grece oraz jego recepcję na gruncie łaciny od 
starożytności rzymskiej po okres nowożytny. W ciągu wieków utarło się 
używanie greckich i łacińskich terminów w odniesieniu do „języka” jako 
synonimów na określenie ludów (czy też grup etnicznych), co we wczesnym 
XIX stuleciu silnie wpłynęło na wykształcenie się normatywnego zrówna-
nia języka z narodem. Stanowiło to początek fenomenu znanego pod nazwą 
„nacjonalizmu etnicznojęzykowego”, który na poziomie państw dominuje 
po dziś dzień w całej Europie Środkowej. Note
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